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Abstract
I analyze the effect of unconventional central bank lending operations on output through
the credit provision channel, which is especially relevant in light of the European Central
Bank’s (ECB’s) unconventional Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) announced
at the end of 2011. I construct a DSGE model containing balance-sheet-constrained commer-
cial banks with a portfolio choice between private loans and government bonds. Commercial
banks have access to central bank funding, for which they must pledge government bonds
as collateral, which creates a link between central bank lending operations and commercial
banks’ portfolio choice. I find that the LTRO’s cumulative impact on output is zero, ir-
respective of the haircut policy, i.e., the amount of central bank funding obtained for one
euro of collateral. The haircut policy, however, allows the central bank to shift output losses
between periods. I find that unlike central bank lending operations, a direct recapitalization
by the fiscal authority does not induce a shift from private credit.
Keywords: ‘Financial Intermediation; Macrofinancial Fragility; Unconventional Monetary
Policy’
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1 Introduction
In December 2011 and February 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) engaged in uncon-
ventional lending operations with the European commercial banking system to prevent a credit
contraction, which would have had serious consequences for the macroeconomy (European Cen-
tral Bank, 2012). These Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) featured a long maturity
(36 months) and a promise by the ECB to provide as much funding to the commercial banks as
demanded against eligible collateral.1 Commercial banks eventually took out more than AC1000
billion in ECB funding, making the LTROs the largest refinancing operation in the history of the
ECB. The goal of this paper is to investigate the macroeconomic impact of such unconventional
central bank lending by linking such a program to the credit transmission channel.
Such a large program has the potential to affect aggregate investment, as this funding can
potentially be used to provide new credit to the real economy. Effects on private credit provision
are relevant in the Eurozone, as 80% of debt-financing to non-financial corporations is interme-
diated by commercial banks (European Central Bank, 2015).2 In fact, expanding credit was one
of the goals of the ECB, as stated by Mario Draghi, president of the ECB:
“...at least the banks will be more inclined to use the money - which was our prime expecta-
tion really - to expand credit to the real economy.” European Central Bank (2012).
It is not so clear, however, whether the ECB funding was used to provide new loans to the
private sector. European commercial banks were undercapitalized at the time (International
Monetary Fund, 2011; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2015), which made it more difficult for them to ex-
pand the balance sheet to provide new credit. Empirical evidence suggests that lending to the
real economy did not expand in Italy, Spain and Portugal, which took out more than 50% of
LTRO funding (Bruegel, 2015), while (domestic) bondholdings sharply increased. In addition,
Drechsler et al. (2016) find that weakly capitalized banks in the Eurozone borrowed more from
the ECB, pledged riskier collateral, and actively invested in distressed sovereign debt after the
European sovereign debt crisis began in 2010. Crosignani et al. (2017) finds that Portuguese
banks purchased domestic bonds during the LTRO allotment. It is therefore not clear from an
empirical point of view whether the funding was used to provide new credit to the real economy.
In this paper I investigate the impact of unconventional central bank lending operations on
credit provision to the real economy and, through that channel, on output. Following up on this
question, I compare the effectiveness of this policy with that of a recapitalization by the fiscal
authority.
1Normally, the ECB provides cash loans to commercial banks under the Main Refinancing Operations (MROs)
and the Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs). In exchange for cash loans, commecial banks must pledge
eligible collateral. MROs have a maturity of one week, and LTROs of three months.
2Throughout the paper, I use ‘commercial banks’ and ‘financial intermediaries’ interchangeably to denote the
same group of economic agents, which capture all kinds of credit institutions: commercial banks, savings banks,
postbanks, and specialized credit institutions, among others.
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European commercial banks have been undercapitalized since the financial crisis of 2007-2009
(International Monetary Fund, 2011; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2015). The Gertler and Karadi (2011)
framework enables me to capture this feature, which I extend in two directions. First, commercial
banks have a portfolio choice between government bonds and private loans, which are used by
non-financial corporations to purchase productive ‘physical’ capital. For details, see Gertler and
Karadi (2013) and Bocola (2016). Second, I introduce the possibility of collateralized central
bank lending, which represents an alternative form of funding for commercial banks besides net
worth and deposits. To obtain central bank funding, commercial banks have to pledge collateral,
for which only government bonds are eligible. In line with LTRO policy at the time, the central
bank has two instruments for its lending policy: the nominal interest rate on central bank funding
and the collateral or haircut policy, which determines how much central bank funding is obtained
for one euro of collateral. The haircut is the difference between the two. I model the LTRO by
temporarily decreasing the interest rate on central bank funding with respect to the interest rate
on deposits.
The main contribution of my paper is linking private credit provision and central bank lending
operations by including a collateral constraint that determines how much central bank funding
is obtained for one euro of government bonds. The requirement to pledge government bonds as
collateral affects the portfolio decision between private loans and government bonds. This setup
allows me to investigate the effect of unconventional central bank lending to commercial banks,
such as the LTROs of December 2011 and February 2012. Within this framework I am also able
to investigate the impact of the haircut policy on the credit provision channel and to explore the
role of financial fragility in such operations.
My first result is that unconventional central bank lending to balance-sheet-constrained com-
mercial banks has a contractionary short-run effect and an expansionary long-run effect. I dis-
tinguish two competing effects. First is the collateral effect, which has a contractionary effect on
output. The LTRO increases the collateral value of government bonds. Commercial banks shift
into government bonds and, consequently, must shed private loans. Credit provision to the real
economy falls, with a contractionary effect on output.
Second is the subsidy effect, which has an expansionary effect on output. Because the interest
rate on central bank funding is below the interest rate on regular deposits, the LTRO reduces
funding costs and increases commercial bank profits. Banks’ balance sheets recover more quickly,
leading to a credit expansion. The collateral effect dominates the short-run effect, but disappears
once the LTRO has ended. The subsidy effect is still present and dominates the long-run effect,
which leads to an expansion of output.
My second and main result is that unconventional central bank lending does not have a
cumulative effect on output. This result holds for different values of the haircut parameter.
Interestingly, the haircut policy does have a pronounced effect on the time-pattern of output. A
smaller haircut leads to a stronger collateral effect and a steeper short-run output contraction. At
the same time, the smaller haircut leads to a stronger economic recovery in the long run through
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the subsidy effect. The mechanism is as follows. The smaller haircut increases the collateral value
and leads to a larger shift into government bonds. More government bonds allow commercial
banks to obtain more low-interest-rate central bank funding, thereby increasing commercial bank
profits. Through the resulting faster balance sheet recovery, I obtain the expansionary effect that
offsets the contractionary collateral effect.
A third result is that the provision of central bank funding, which amounts to an indirect
recapitalization of the financial sector, is less effective in stimulating output than a direct recapi-
talization by the fiscal authority. A direct recapitalization provides commercial banks with new
net worth and alleviates banks’ balance sheets constraints. Contrary to central bank lending
operations, a direct recap does not involve crowding out private loans by government bonds.
My paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, it relates to recent papers
that study the transmission to the macroeconomy of shocks to the balance sheets of financial
intermediaries (Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010; Gertler and Karadi, 2011, 2013). In all these mo-
dels, financial intermediaries face an endogenous leverage constraint that limits the size of the
balance sheet for a given amount of net worth. Kirchner and van Wijnbergen (2016) extend
this framework by introducing a portfolio choice between private loans and government debt.
A debt-financed fiscal expansion increases commercial banks’ bondholdings, which crowds out
private credit. My framework also features crowding out through an alternative mechanism:
the provision of central bank funding at an interest rate below that on deposits increases the
collateral value of government bonds and makes government bonds more attractive.
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Bocola (2016) allow for central bank lending to financial
intermediaries, in an otherwise similar setup as my paper. Bocola (2016), who explicitly looks at
the LTRO, finds a small positive effect on lending and output because central bank funding relaxes
bank balance sheet constraints in this setup. My paper differs in two dimensions: first, central
bank funding does not directly relax bank balance sheet constraints, but does so only indirectly by
providing debt financing at an interest below that on regular deposit funding. Second, commercial
banks must pledge government bonds as collateral, giving rise to the collateral effect, which is
absent in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Bocola (2016). Contrary to Bocola (2016), I find a
contractionary short-run effect on private credit provision and output due to the collateral effect.
Contrary to Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Bocola (2016), Schabert (2015) and Ho¨rmann
and Schabert (2015) include the requirement to pledge collateral to access central bank lending
facilities. These papers find that a smaller haircut has an expansionary effect on output. My
paper differs along two dimensions: first, Schabert (2015) and Ho¨rmann and Schabert (2015)
explicitly incorporate money holdings, as households face a cash-in-advance constraint for which
they can borrow at the central bank. Instead, I consider a cashless economy in which central
bank lending is an alternative form of debt financing at an interest rate (possibly) below that
on deposits. Second, instead of providing central bank funding to unconstrained households,
commercial banks in my model are the only agents in the economy with access to central bank
funding. Because commercial banks are balance-sheet-constrained, forcing them to pledge col-
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lateral to obtain central bank funding affects the portfolio decision between private loans and
government bonds, giving rise to the collateral effect. Contrary to Schabert (2015) and Ho¨rmann
and Schabert (2015), I find that the haircut policy does not have a cumulative impact on output,
because the expansionary subsidy effect is offset by the short-run collateral effect.
Finally, my paper connects to the literature on government bond accumulation by commercial
banks. Becker and Ivashina (2016) find empirical evidence for the crowding out of private loans by
increased holdings of government bonds and for financial repression by governments. Crosignani
(2016) develops a general equilibrium model in which banks shift into domestic sovereign debt
when undercapitalized. Domestic sovereign debt has the highest payoff in the good state of the
world, which is the only state banks care about. Banks have limited liability, and therefore do not
care about being bankrupt in the bad state of the world. Hence, government bond accumulation
by commercial banks arises because of risk shifting. Government bond accumulation in my model
arises because commercial banks need government bonds for collateral purposes when the central
bank engages in special lending operations with commercial banks.
I describe some stylized facts in section 2. The model description can be found in section 3,
while section 4 discusses the calibration of my model. Section 5 presents the results from my
simulations, and section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Stylized facts
Credit institutions in the Eurozone play a crucial role in the provision of credit to the real eco-
nomy, as they intermediate approximately 80% of debt financing to non-financial corporations
(European Central Bank, 2015). The LTROs of December 2011 and February 2012 provided
credit institutions with fresh liquidity amounting to approximately 10% of Eurozone GDP. Ho-
wever, did the credit institutions use this funding to provide new loans to the real economy? Did
they expand their balance sheets? In this section, I present some stylized facts regarding the
aggregated balance sheets of Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs) at the time of the LTROs
of December 2011 and February 2012.
Data about the refinancing operations of the ECB were collected from Bruegel (2015), while
balance sheet data of MFIs were collected from the ECB’s statistical warehouse (European
Central Bank, 2015). The time series have a monthly frequency. Balance sheet data of MFIs,
excluding the European System of Central Banks, are available at a country level.3 The vast ma-
jority of euro-area MFIs are credit institutions (i.e., commercial banks, savings banks, postbanks,
specialized credit institutions, among others) (European Central Bank, 2011b).
3MFIs include “credit institutions and non-credit institutions (mainly money market funds) whose business
is to receive deposits from entities other than MFIs and to grant credit and/or invest in securities” (European
Central Bank, 2011b).
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Country use of ECB funding
Figure 1 shows the stock of total refinancing operations in the Eurozone, as well as the country use
by MFIs in Italy, Spain and Portugal. Total refinancing operations consist of Main Refinancing
Operations (MROs) and Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs), which differ in their
respective maturity. MROs have a maturity of one week, while regular LTROs feature a maturity
of three months. Contrary to regular LTROs, the LTROs of December 2011 and February 2012
featured a maturity of 36 months. I show the sum of MROs and LTROs because part of the
LTROs of December 2011 and February 2012 were used to repay outstanding MROs and/or roll
over outstanding LTROs.
















Figure 1: Country use of outstanding MROs and LTROs by MFIs in Italy (IT), Spain (ES),
Portugal (PT) and the rest of the Eurozone (RE) in AC billion from January 2011 to January
2013. The two vertical lines refer to December 1st, 2011 and March 1st, 2012, which mark the
beginning of the period in which the two LTROs took place and the end, respectively. Source:
Bruegel (2015).
Figure 1 suggests three main observations. First, the stock of total refinancing operations
increased by approximately AC350 billion during the period in which the two unconventional
LTROs were undertaken. The net increase is smaller than the gross increase of AC1000 billion,
which was mentioned in the introduction, because part of the gross increase has been used to
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repay outstanding MROs and/or roll over outstanding LTROs. Second, a disproportionate share
of the funding went to MFIs in Italy, Spain and Portugal. By March 1st, 2012, more than 50%
of total ECB funding had been borrowed by MFIs from these countries, while their cumulative
share in Eurozone GDP is less than one-third. Apparently, the LTROs of December 2011 and
February 2012 were especially attractive for MFIs in Italy, Spain and Portugal. Third, the use of
ECB funding by MFIs from these three countries amounted to a large share of their respective
GDP. On March 1st, 2012, ECB funding accounted for AC200 billion of debt funding for Italian
MFIs, which is close to 20% of Italian GDP. For Spain, this number is as high as AC400 billion,
which amounts to 40% of Spanish GDP. To sum up, ECB funding constituted a significant source
of debt funding for MFIs in Italy, Spain and Portugal.
Balance sheet composition MFIs
Figure 2 shows the total asset holdings of MFIs in Italy, Spain and Portugal. I normalize total
asset holdings to 100 on December 1st, 2011 which is one week before the unconventional LTROs
were announced by the ECB (European Central Bank, 2011a). The figure suggests a small
expansion in total MFI assets during the period in which the two LTROs took place.





















Figure 2: Total assets of Monetary Financial Institutions (MFI’s) excluding the European System
of Central Banks in Italy (IT), Spain (ES), and Portugal (PT) from January 2011 to January
2013. Levels were rescaled with respect to total assets on December 1st, 2011, which has a value
of 100 in all three plots. Source: ECB.
A more important question from a macroeconomic point of view is whether credit to non-
financial corporations and households expandedwith doubts raised by Panel 3a, which depicts
private credit to the real economy as a percentage of total MFI assets: credit fell by one to two
percentage points in all three countries during the period in which the two LTROs took place.
There seems to be a clear break between credit levels (as a percentage of MFI assets) in the
period before December 2011 and those in the period after March 2012 in Portugal and Spain.
Although credit as a percentage of total MFI assets also fell in Italy during this period, credit
had already been falling in the months before the first intervention, and it is less clear whether
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the fall can be attributed to the two LTROs. Given that balance sheets expanded very little
(Figure 2), the data suggest that private credit intermediation measured in euros fell. The data
clearly indicate that a credit expansion, as envisaged by ECB President Draghi, did not occur.
At the same time, Panel 3b shows an increase in domestic government bondholdings of one
to one-and-a-half percentage points of total MFI assets for all three countries during the period,
amounting to a striking increase of 30% in euros of government bondholdings. This result is in
line with the findings of Drechsler et al. (2016) and Crosignani et al. (2017). There is a clear
break between government bondholdings in the period before December 2011 and those in the
period after March 2012.
These figures give a mixed message: while balance sheets slightly expanded in the direct
aftermath of the LTROs, MFIs shifted from private credit to government bonds, given the fraction
of total assets invested in a particular asset class. One possible explanation for this finding is
that government bonds can easily be pledged as collateral to obtain funding from the ECB. In
addition, haircuts, i.e., the amount of central bank funding obtained for one euro of collateral,
are usually small for government bonds. Loans to non-financial corporations and households,
however, are usually difficult to convert into eligible collateral, and usually come with a larger
haircut.
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Figure 3: Balance sheet composition of Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs) excluding the
European System of Central Banks in Italy (IT), Spain (ES), and Portugal (PT) from January
2011 to January 2013. Panel 3a shows loans to non-financial corporations (NFC) and households
(HH) as a percentage of total MFI assets. Panel 3b shows domestic government bondholdings
as a percentage of total MFI assets. The two dashed vertical lines refer to December 1st, 2011
and March 1st, 2012, respectively, which mark the beginning and the end of the period in which




I consider a standard New-Keynesian model, which includes commercial banks that are balance-
sheet-constrained, as in Gertler and Karadi (2011), and have a portfolio choice between private
loans and government bonds, as in Gertler and Karadi (2013). The asset side is financed by net
worth, deposits and central bank funding. Commercial banks need to pledge collateral in the form
of government bonds to obtain funding from the central bank, while private loans are not eligible
as collateral. The central bank determines the interest rate on both regular deposits and central
bank funding and how much funding commercial banks receive for one euro in government bonds,
i.e., the haircut applied to collateral. The central bank can decrease the interest rate on central
bank funding in times of financial crises, compared with the interest rate on regular household
deposits, and finances its lending operations by issuing deposits to households. Central bank
profits and losses are transferred period by period to the fiscal authority.
In addition to commercial banks and a central bank, the economy contains households, a pro-
duction sector, and a fiscal authority. Each household consists of workers and bankers. Workers
supply labor to intermediate goods producers, while bankers run the commercial banks. Interme-
diate goods producers borrow from commercial banks to purchase physical capital from capital
goods producers, who face convex adjustment costs. Labor is hired the next period, together
with capital used for the production of the intermediate good. Intermediate goods producers
sell their goods to retail goods producers and sell the used capital back to the capital goods pro-
ducers. Retail goods producers face monopolistic competition and price-stickiness, as in Calvo
(1983) and Yun (1996). Final goods producers operate in a perfectly competitive market and
purchase from retail goods producers while taking prices as given. The final good is sold to hou-
seholds for consumption, to capital goods producers as investment, and to the government. The
government honors outstanding obligations, (potentially) provides financial sector support, co-
vers possible central bank losses, and finances these expenditures by raising lump-sum taxes and
issuing (long-term) debt, in a way similar to Woodford (1998, 2001). Fiscal policy is determined
via (exogenous) fiscal rules.
3.2 Households
A continuum of households with measure one are infinitely lived, and exhibit identical preferen-
ces and asset endowments. Each household consists of bankers and workers. There is perfect
consumption insurance within the household, which allows me to keep the representative agent
representation. Households obtain utility from consumption ct, while labor ht provides disutility.
Households receive income from labor at wage rate wt. Households can invest in one period debt
at, which consists of deposits dt and loans to the central bank (CB) d
cb
t , which can be treated
as perfect substitutes from the household’s point of view by assumption, i.e. at = dt + d
cb
t .
Investment of at−1 in period t − 1 yields repayment of principal at−1 and interest rdt in period
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where qbt−1 is the bond price in period t − 1, and sb,ht−1 the number of bonds purchased in pe-
riod t − 1. Besides that, they receive income from profits Πt from the production sector and
the financial sector. Income is used for consumption ct, investment in one period debt at and
investment in government bonds sb,ht at price q
b
t . Households pay a cost for the intermediation
of government bonds, which is quadratic in the deviation of the number of bonds from the level
sˆb,h to capture in a simple way the limited participation in asset markets by households (Gertler
and Karadi, 2013). The government levies lump sum taxes τt. Household members derive utility
from consumption and leisure, with habit formation in consumption to more realistically capture
consumption dynamics, as in Christiano et al. (2005).Households maximize expected life-time



































This will give rise to the following first order conditions:






















 = 1, (4)
where λt is the marginal utility of consumption. The household’s stochastic discount factor
is βΛt,t+1 = βλt+1/λt. Equation (1) denotes the marginal utility from an additional unit of
consumption, while equation (2) equates the marginal cost from an additional unit of labor in
the form of disutility with the marginal benefit from additional wage income. Equation (3) and
(4) weigh the benefit from an additional unit of consumption tomorrow from investing in deposits
respectively government bonds, with the cost of lower consumption today.
3.3 Financial intermediaries
3.3.1 Optimization problem
Financial intermediaries channel funds from savers to borrowers. They invest in two asset classes:
private loans to intermediate goods producers sk,pj,t and government bonds s
b,p












where qkt is the price of private loans, and q
b
t the price of government bonds. Intermediaries fund
their assets through net worth nj,t, risk-free household deposits dj,t and central bank funding
dcbj,t:
pj,t = nj,t + dj,t + d
cb
j,t,
New net worth is the difference between the return on assets and the return on debt funding. Net
worth can be increased through financial sector support by the government, which is proportional
to previous period net worth (ngj,t = τ
n
t nj,t−1). Net worth decreases when the financial sector
has to repay previously administered support, which is also proportional to previous period net






t will be defined in section 3.5. The law of motion for














− (1 + rdt+1) dj,t − (1 + rcbt+1) dcbj,t + ngj,t+1 − n˜gj,t+1
=
(















− (1 + rdt+1 + τnt+1 − τ˜nt+1) dj,t − (1 + rcbt+1 + τnt+1 − τ˜nt+1) dcbj,t,
where rkt is the net real return on private loans in period t, r
b
t the net real return on government
bonds, rdt the net real return on deposits and r
cb
t the net real return on central bank funding.
Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), I assume intermediaries are forced to shut down with
probability σ, which is i.i.d. and exogenous, both in time and the cross-section. When the
intermediary is forced to stop operating, all net worth is paid out to the household, the ultimate






















Households face an agency problem when deciding on the amount of funds to save through
deposits, as in Gertler and Karadi (2011, 2013): financial intermediaries have the capability
to divert assets when moving from the current to the next period. Depositors can force the
intermediary into bankruptcy in that case, but will only recoup a fraction 1 − λa of asset class
a = {k, b}. The remaining fraction λa of each asset class is paid out as a dividend to the household
owning the intermediary. Depositors, however anticipate this possibility, and will in equilibrium
only provide deposits up to the point where the continuation value of the intermediary is larger
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≥ λkqkt sk,pj,t + λbqbtsb,pj,t . (5)
Financial intermediaries have access to central bank funding dcbj,t, but are required to pledge
collateral in the form of government bonds. The commercial bank remains the legal owner of the
bond, and will receive the interest payments from the bond after repayment of dcbj,t to the central
bank in period t+ 1, unless the financial intermediary becomes insolvent, a case I abstain from
through a proper calibration. The collateral constraint has the following functional form:
dcbj,t ≤ θtqbtsb,pj,t , (6)
where θt is the haircut parameter that regulates the collateral policy of the central bank, see
section 3.5. A low θt, or a high haircut, indicates that a commercial bank will obtain little
central bank financing for a euro of government bonds. The optimization problem of the financial
intermediary can now be formulated:
Vj,t = max{sk,pj,t ,sb,pj,t ,dj,t,dcbj,t}
Et {βΛt,t+1 [(1− σ)nj,t+1 + σVj,t+1]} ,
s.t.
Vj,t ≥ λkqkt sk,pj,t + λbqbtsb,pj,t ,













































3.3.2 First order conditions




















































where µt is the Lagrange multiplier on the bank’s balance sheet constraint (5), and ψt the La-
grangian multiplier on the collateral constraint (6). ηt denotes the shadow value of an additional
unit of net worth. Ωt,t+1 = βΛt,t+1 [(1− σ) + σ (1 + µt+1) ηt+1] is the intermediaries’ stochastic
discount factor, and can be interpreted as the household’s stochastic discount factor βΛt,t+1,
augmented by an additional term to incorporate the effect of the financial frictions.
First order condition (7) pins down the bank’s portfolio choice on the asset side of the balance
sheet. The left hand side denotes the marginal benefit to the financial intermediary from investing
an additional unit of private loans, valued by the intermediaries’ stochastic discount factor, and
corrected by the term λb/λk to reflect the fact that the financial friction is more severe for private
loans than for government bonds. The right hand side denotes the marginal cost of giving up an
additional unit of government bonds, measured by the credit spread between government bonds
and the deposit rate. But government bonds also derive value from the fact that they serve as
collateral with which intermediaries can obtain central bank funding, which is reflected by the
second term on the right hand side of equation (7).
Equation (8) is the first order condition for private loans. We clearly see that the presence of
a binding bank balance sheet constraint (µt > 0 in equation (5)) limits the ability of commercial
banks to arbitrage away the difference between the expected rate of return on private loans and
deposits, since commercial banks cannot expand the balance sheet.
The portfolio choice on the liabilities side of the balance sheet is given by equation (9): an
increase in the credit spread between deposits and central bank funding rdt+1 − rcbt+1 increases
the collateral value of government bonds ψt everything else equal, and leads to a shift into
government bonds, see (7), which allows the commercial bank to increase the amount of central
bank funding.
Equation (10) shows the shadow value of an additional unit of net worth ηt, which is equal
to the expected gross return on deposits, discounted by the intermediaries’ stochastic discount
factor Ωt,t+1. The expected return is augmented by the financial sector support per unit of net
worth τnt+1 and the repayment per unit of net worth τ˜
n
t+1. Using these first order conditions, I
can derive the following proposition:
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Proposition 1. central bank lending and the collateral policy only have a first order effect when
both the bank balance sheet constraint (5) is binding and the interest rate on deposits rdt+1 is not
equal to the interest rate on central bank funding rcbt+1.
Lemma 1. If the bank balance sheet constraint (5) is not binding, then there is no first order
effect from central bank lending on private credit.
Proof. Consider optimal choices for the financial intermediary. When equation (5) is not binding,
µt is equal to zero. From equation (8), we see that the expected return on private loans must
equal the expected rate on deposits. The term on the left hand side of equation (7) is zero, and
is not affected by ψt, which captures the effects from central bank lending.
Lemma 2. When the interest rate on deposits rdt+1 and central bank funding r
cb
t+1 are equal,
there is no effect from central bank lending and/or the haircut parameter θt.
Proof. When rdt+1 = r
cb
t+1, we find from equation (9) that ψt = 0. This implies that the second
term on the right hand side of equation (7) drops out. This is the only first order condition
where ψt, which measures the collateral value of government bonds, and the haircut parameter
θt show up. Hence, central bank lending does not affect the portfolio decision between private
loans and government bonds.
Proof of Proposition 1. To have an effect from central bank lending, lemma 2 shows that the
interest rate on deposits and central bank funding has to differ. Lemma 1 shows that even when
the interest rate on deposits and central bank funding is different (captured by ψt > 0), there is
no first order effect unless the bank balance sheet constraint is binding (µt > 0).
Note that when the interest rate on deposits and central bank funding is the same (ψt = 0),
commercial banks are indifferent between the two funding sources, since the collateral value of
government bonds is now zero. Deposits and central bank funding are perfect substitutes. Hence
I can take the collateral constraint to be binding in my simulations, irrespective of the difference
between the interest rate on deposits and that on central bank funding.
Because of the proposition, and the fact that European commercial banks have been un-
dercapitalized since the financial crisis of 2007-2009 (International Monetary Fund, 2011; Hoshi
and Kashyap, 2015), I will take both the bank’s balance sheet constraint (5) and the collateral
constraint (6) to be binding in my simulations. When the bank’s balance sheet constraint (5) is
binding, I can rewrite it into the following equation:









It is clear from equation (11) that the size of the balance sheet is limited by the amount of
current net worth nj,t.
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3.3.3 Aggregate law of motion net worth
The law of motion for aggregate net worth consists of the net worth of the bankers that are
allowed to continue operating, together with the aggregate net worth given to new bankers,
which is equal to a fraction χ of previous period assets pt−1. Together with net government























+ χpt−1 + n
g
t − n˜gt . (12)







The production factor is modeled in standard New-Keynesian fashion. I will shortly outline the
setup below, with a more detailed exposition in appendix A.2.
3.4.1 Intermediate Goods Producers
A continuum of intermediate goods producers, that face perfect competition, acquire capital
ki,t−1 from capital producers at the end of period t−1 for a price qkt−1 through a state-contingent
loan ski,t−1 = ki,t−1 from the financial intermediaries. Next period’s profits can credibly be
pledged to the intermediaries, as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). After realization of the shocks,
the producers hire labour hi,t at a wage wt, and start producing intermediate goods with previous
period capital ki,t−1 and labor hi,t as input. After production, the intermediate goods producers
pay a state-contingent net real return rkt over claims issued in period t, with the following
production technology:
yi,t = zt(ξtki,t−1)αh1−αi,t .
Quality of capital ξt and total factor productivity zt are driven by exogenous AR(1) processes.
Output yi,t is sold to retail firms for a price mt. The effective capital stock (after depreciation)
is sold to the capital producers for a price qkt and the proceeds are used to pay back the loans
and a net return to the financial intermediaries, after paying wages set in a perfectly competitive
labor market:
wt = (1− α)mtyi,t/hi,t, (14)
1 + rkt =




A capital quality shock ξt decreases the return on capital for two reasons: production decreases,
as capital becomes less productive, reducing the first term of (15). But the capital price qkt will
fall, leading to a further decrease in the return on capital because of the second term in (15).
3.4.2 Capital Producers
Capital producers purchase the effective capital stock that is left after production (including
depreciation), (1 − δ)ξtkt−1, from the intermediate goods producers. They also purchase an
amount it of final goods, and convert the old capital stock and newly purchased final goods
into new capital. The newly produced capital stock kt is subsequently sold to the intermediate
goods producers at the same price qkt that was paid for the capital after production. The capital
producers face convex adjustment costs, so that for every unit it only 1−Ψ(ιt) units of capital
are produced, with ιt = it/it−1 representing the change in the investment level. The expression
for the capital stock after the capital producers have produced (or output of capital producers)
is then:




A continuum of differentiated retail firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] transform intermediate goods yi,t
into differentiated retail goods yf,t = yi,t under monopolistic competition. Each period, only a
random portion (1− ψ) of retail firms is allowed to reset their prices Pf,t, while the other firms
must keep their prices fixed, see Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). Retail firms face the demand
function yf,t = (Pf,t/Pt)
−





P 1−f,t df .
3.4.4 Final Goods Producers
Final goods producers purchase the differentiated retail goods yf,t to produce final goods. They









where  represents the elasticity of substitution between goods bought from the retail firms. Final
good producers operate in a perfectly competitive market. Hence they take prices as given, and
sell their goods for the same price Pt. Final goods are sold to households and government for




The government issues bt long term bonds in period t, and raises q
b
t bt in revenue, with q
b
t the
market price of bonds. I parametrize the maturity structure of government debt like Woodford
(1998, 2001). A bond issued in period t− 1 pays a cash flow rc in period t, ρrc in period t+ 1,
ρ2rc in period t+ 2, etc. The rate of return r
b
t on a bond purchased in period t− 1 is given by:






where ρ pins down the maturity4 of government debt, see for more details Van der Kwaak and
Van Wijnbergen (2014). The government also raises revenue by levying lump sum taxes τt on the
households and receives profits Πcbt from the central bank. Government purchases are constant
in real terms: gt = G. Furthermore, the government may provide assistance to the financial
sector by injecting new net worth ngt . The government also receives repayment from previously
administered support n˜gt . The budget constraint is given by:











The tax rule of the government is given by a rule which makes sure the intertemporal government
budget constraint is satisfied (Bohn, 1998): where b¯ is the steady state level of debt. κn controls
the way government transfers to the financial sector are financed. If κn = 0, support is financed
by new debt. κn = 1 implies that the additional spending is completely financed by increasing
lump sum taxes. I parametrize government support as follows:
ngt = τ
n
t nt−1, ζ ≤ 0, l ≥ 0, (18)
τnt = ζεξ,t−l.
Thus the government provides funds to the financial sector if ζ < 0 (a negative shock εξ,t−l
to the quality of capital). Depending on the value of l, the government can provide support
instantaneously (l = 0), or with a lag (l > 0). Furthermore, ϑ indicates the extent to which the
government needs to be repaid:
n˜gt = ϑn
g
t−e, ϑ ≥ 0, e ≥ 1. (19)
ϑ = 0 means the support is a gift from the government. In case ϑ = 1, the government aid is
a zero interest loan, while a ϑ > 1 implies that the financial intermediaries have to pay interest







over the support received earlier.5 The parameter e denotes the amount of time after which the
government aid has to be paid back.
3.5.2 Central Bank Conventional Interest Rate Policy
The Central Bank sets the nominal interest rate on deposits rnt according to a standard Taylor
rule, in order to minimize output and inflation deviations:
rnt = (1− ρr)
[






t−1 + εr,t, (20)
where εr,t ∼ N(0, σ2r), and κpi > 1 and κy > 0 (active monetary policy). The parameter p¯i is




can be interpreted as a conventional monetary
stimulus in times of financial crises. The real interest rate on deposits then equals:
1 + rdt = (1 + r
n
t−1)/pit. (21)
3.5.3 Central Bank Balance Sheet Policy
Besides conventional interest rate policy, the central bank lends dcbt to the commercial banking
system. In order to obtain access to this facility, commercial banks are required to provide
collateral in the form of government bonds, see equation (6). Collateral is needed in order for
the creditor to recoup the principal in case of a debtor’s bankruptcy. A haircut is applied to
protect the creditor from capital losses on the collateral.
The central bank has two instruments for its balance sheet policy. It controls the nominal
interest rate rn,cbt on central bank funding provided to commercial banks, and the haircut pa-
rameter θt applied to the collateral. For a given interest rate r
n,cb
t and haircut parameter θt,
the central bank provides as much funding as demanded by the commercial banks, in line with
the Fixed Rate Full Alotment policy of the ECB after October 2008.6 The central bank can
lower the nominal interest rate rn,cbt in times of crisis with respect to the interest rate on regular





t − Γcbt . (22)
The credit spread Γcbt between the nominal rate on deposits and the nominal rate on central
bank funding is given by:





5The case where ϑ > 1 happened in the Netherlands, where financial intermediaries received government
aid with a penalty rate of 50 percent. EU state support rules usually require financial intermediaries to repay
previously received state support with a penalty rate.
6Before October 2008, the ECB used to auction a given amount of funding against eligible collateral, with the
interest rate being determined in the auctioning process. In October 2008, the ECB switched to a Fixed Rate Full
Alotment policy, under which the ECB sets the collateral haircuts and the interest rate, and provides commercial
banks with the funding demanded (European Central Bank, 2015).
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where Γ¯cb is the steady state credit spread. When κcb < 0, a financial crisis increases the interest
rate spread between deposits and central bank funding, decreasing funding costs for commercial
banks.
The second policy instrument is the haircut parameter θt that is applied to the collateral.
From equation (6) we see that a commercial bank delivering qbts
b
j,t in government bonds, provides




j,t units of central bank funding. Hence the collateral haircut is 1−θt.
A higher value of θt allows the commercial bank to obtain more central bank funding for the
same number of government bonds, which increases the collateral value of government bonds.
The haircut parameter θt is possibly time-varying, and is given by the following process:





where θ¯ is the steady state haircut parameter, which increases in a financial crisis by setting
κd,cb < 0. The asset side of the central bank balance sheet consists of loans dcbt to commercial
banks on which it receives a nominal interest rate rn,cbt . The liabilities consist of household
deposits7 on which it pays the nominal deposit rate rnt . Central bank profits (or losses) are
passed on to the fiscal authority period by period. Hence central bank net worth is zero, and
liabilities consist solely of household deposits. Real central bank profits (or actually losses, since
























Note that without the central bank intervention, commercial banks would have to pay the interest
rate rdt . Hence the central bank losses Π
cb
t can be interpreted as the subsidy given by the central
bank to the commercial banks.
3.6 Market clearing
In equilibrium, the total number of private loans kt must equal the total number of loans provided
by the financial intermediaries. Similarly, the total bond supply must equal the bonds purchased
7Central banks in most advanced economies are not directly financed through deposits, but through interest
bearing commercial bank reserves. I could model this by including commercial bank reserves on the asset side of
commercial banks. Commercial banks would not be capable of diverting commercial bank reserves in such a setup
because the central bank is in charge of the reserve system. Commercial banks are not balance-sheet-constrained
in financing commercial bank reserves in such a setup. Hence explicitly modelling commercial bank reserves is
equivalent to letting the central bank be financed directly by household deposits, see also Gertler and Karadi
(2011)
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The aggregate resource constraint is given by:









The resulting equilibrium definition can be found in appendix D.2, which gioves a complete
description of the model can be found including the standard first order conditions that have
been left out in the main text.
4 Calibration
I calibrate the model on a quarterly frequency. I solve the model using a perturbation method
that solves for the policy function with a first-order approximation around the non-stochastic
steady state. The parameter values can be found in Table 1. Most of the parameter values are
common in the literature on DSGE models, or frequently used in models containing financial
frictions. I follow Gertler and Karadi (2011) for these parameters. Standard parameter values are
the subjective discount factor β, the habit formation parameter υ, the inverse Frisch elasticity
ϕ, the elasticity of substitution for final goods producers , the Calvo probability of keeping
prices fixed ψ, the capital share in output α, the investment adjustment parameter γ, and the
smoothing parameters for production ρz and the quality of capital ρξ. Parameters regarding
conventional monetary policy are set at relatively standard values. The interest rate smoothing
parameter ρr is set at 0.4, to reflect a more aggressive response of conventional monetary policy,
which is in normal times in the range of 0.8− 0.9.
Other coefficients are calibrated to match specific targets: the relative utility weight of la-
bor Ψ is calibrated to have the steady state labor supply equal 1/3. A crucial parameter in
my analysis is the intermediation cost for households on bond holdings κsb,h . This affects the
elasticity of household demand for government bonds in response to changes in the bond price.
When commercial banks want to increase their bond holdings because of central bank funding
provided at an attractive interest rate, this parameter indicates how willing households are to
sell government bonds to commercial banks. I set κsb,h equal to 0.0025. For this parameter
value, a decrease in the interest rate on central bank funding of 50 basispoints on impact with
respect to the interest rate on deposits leads to an increased recourse to central bank funding of
apprxoimately 5% of annual steady state GDP, which is on the conservative side in comparison




β 0.990 Discount rate
υ 0.815 Degree of habit formation
Ψ 3.6023 Relative utility weight of labor
ϕ 0.276 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply
κsb,h 0.0025 Constant portfolio adjustment cost function
sˆb,h 1.6656 Reference level portfolio adjustment cost function
Financial Intermediaries
λk 0.3861 Fraction of private loans that can be diverted
λb 0.1930 Fraction of gov’t bonds that can be diverted
χ 0.0026 Proportional transfer to entering bankers
σ 0.95 Survival rate of the bankers
Intermediate good firms
 4.176 Elasticity of substitution
ψ 0.779 Calvo probability of keeping prices fixed
α 0.330 Effective capital share
Capital good firms
γ 1.728 Investment adjustment cost parameter
δ 0.0592 Depreciation rate
Autoregressive components
ρz 0.95 Autoregressive component of productivity
ρξ 0.66 Autoregressive component of capital quality
ρr 0.4 Interest rate smoothing parameter
Policy
rc 0.04 Real payment to government bondholder
ρ 0.96 Parameter government debt duration (5 yrs)
κb 0.050 Tax feedback parameter from government debt
κpi 1.500 Inflation feedback on nominal interest rate
κy 0.125 Output feedback on nominal interest rate
Shocks
σz 0.010 Standard deviation productivity shock
σξ 0.050 Standard deviation capital quality shock
σr 0.0025 Standard deviation interest rate surprise shock
Table 1: Model parameters.
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shown in Section 2.
Other parameters are calibrated to match data from the periphery of the Eurozone, where
most LTRO funding was taken up.8 I target the steady state investment-GDP ratio and the ste-
ady state government spending-GDP ratio, and set both to 0.2, in line with long term average va-
lues in the periphery. The depreciation rate δ is calibrated to target the steady state investment-
GDP ratio and a steady state credit spread Γk between private loans and deposits of 50 basis-
points (quarterly), which is the average difference between the interest rate on total loans to
non-financial corporations and total overnight deposits to households and non-profit institutions
in the periphery of the Eurozone over the period from July 2010 to June 2011.
The steady state leverage ratio is targeted by taking monthly country level data on Monetary
Financial Institutions (MFIs) excluding the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) from
the European Central Bank (2015). I aggregate total MFI assets from the periphery countries,
as well as MFI capital and reserves. I divide aggregate MFI assets over aggregate MFI capital
and reserves to find a monthly time-series for the average MFI leverage ratio, which was equal
to 12 in the beginning of 2011. Due to the fact that the cash flows from private loans are the
residual after wages have been paid out, private loans are more like equity than debt in my
model. Taking a leverage ratio of 12 would therefore overstate fluctuations in net worth. Hence
I reduce the steady state leverage ratio to 6, a procedure also applied by Gertler and Karadi
(2013).
The parameter σ is set in such a way that the average survival period for bankers is 20
quarters. To make sure that this parameter value is not driving the model results, I investigate
the model response for different values of σ in Appendix E. I calibrate the diversion parameter
for government bonds λb to equal 0.5 times the diversion rate for private loans λk, as in Gertler
and Karadi (2013). To make sure that this value does not drive my results, I investigate the
model response for different values of λb in Appendix E. The steady state value of the haircut
parameter θ¯ is set to 0.95, implying a steady state haircut of 5% on government bonds pledged to
the central bank as collateral, which is in line with the haircut on periphery sovereign debt at the
time. The steady state spread Γcb between the interest rate on deposits and central bank lending
facilities is equal to zero, reflecting the fact that these facilities only have value to commercial
banks in times of financial crisis, and are otherwise perfect substitutes.
I calibrate the steady state government liabilities q¯bb¯ to be equal to 100% of annual steady
state output, in line with the average debt level in the periphery at the start of the crisis in 2011.
The average duration of government bonds is 5 years and can be calculated from the stress tests
performed by the European Banking Authority (2011). The cash flow payment to the bondholder
rc is set to 0.04, in line with coupon payments on long term government debt. The tax feedback
parameter κb is set to 0.05 in order to guarantee intertemporal solvency of the budget constraint
of the fiscal authority. The effect of this parameter is limited, because taxes are lump-sum in my
model. We set the steady state fraction of government bonds placed at commercial banks to be
8The Eurozone periphery consists of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain in my calibration
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equal to 25% of total government bonds, approximately equal to the average fraction of periphery
bonds placed at periphery banks. A financial crisis is initiated as in Gertler and Karadi (2011)
by having a one standard deviation capital quality shock of σξ = 0.050, and an autoregressive
component of ρξ = 0.66.
I conduct several robustness checks in Appendix E. I will perform this check along two
dimensions. First, I will change some of the key parameters of the model. A second line of
robustness checks is along the dimension of model specification. I perform these checks to make
sure that my model results do not depend on some arbitrary parameter choice or a particular
model specification.
5 Results
In this section I discuss the results from the model simulations. I first simulate a financial crisis
with no additional support measures to explain the general mechanism of the model. I then
proceed to look at the case where the interest rate on central bank funding is decreased with
respect to the interest rate on regular deposits, capturing the LTROs of December 2011 and
February 2012. I continue by investigating the impact of different haircut parameters, and I
conclude by comparing the effect of the LTRO with the effect of an immediate debt-financed
recapitalization by the fiscal authority.
5.1 Financial crisis impact, no additional policy
I start by inspecting the response of the economy to a financial crisis in Figure 4, where the
financial crisis is initiated through a capital quality shock ξt of 5% compared with the steady
state, as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). For now, I abstain from a policy intervention by the central
bank. The capital quality shock deteriorates the return on private loans, and hence commercial
banks suffer losses, as can be seen from equation (15). Net worth falls, and (commercial) bank
balance sheet constraints tighten. Credit spreads and (expected) interest rates increase, reducing
the demand for private loans and capital, which leads to a drop in the price of capital. Remember
that the capital is sold by intermediate goods producers after production, and the proceeds are
used to repay the loan from the commercial bank. Hence a lower capital price leads to additional
losses on the outstanding loans to the intermediate goods producers. Net worth of commercial
banks falls further, leading to a second round of interest rate increases.
Balance sheet tightening of commercial banks does not only affect credit spreads on private
loans, but also induces commercial banks to sell government bonds. Bond prices go down,
and impose capital losses on existing bondholders, resulting in an additional fall in commercial
banks’ net worth on top of the losses on private loans, further tightening bank balance sheet
constraints. Since the interest rate on deposits and central bank funding are equal, it follows
from equation (9) that the collateral value of government bonds is zero. Commercial banks shrink
their balance sheet by selling government bonds to the household sector, thereby increasing the
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fraction of the balance sheet invested in private credit, see panel “Fraction of assets in private
loans”. As previously mentioned, banks can only sell government bonds to households, but not
private loans. A lower bond price makes it more attractive for households (who are not balance-
sheet-constrained) to purchase additional government bonds. When commercial banks oﬄoad
government bonds to households, central bank lending falls along by approximately 80% with
respect to the steady state.
Lower private credit provision adversely affects the real economy: investment drops by 8%
with respect to steady state, and a lower capital stock leads to lower wages and reduced household
income. The wealth effect causes consumption to fall, generating, together with the fall in
investment, a drop in output of almost 3%.
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions for the case with no additional policy. The financial crisis
is initiated through a negative capital quality shock of 5 percent relative to the steady state.
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5.2 No additional policy vs. unconventional monetary policy
In this section I will derive my first result. Consider the effect of an unconventional central bank
intervention in Figure 5. I compare the no intervention case from section 5.1 (blue, solid) with a
policy that entails an increase in the interest rate spread Γcbt between the nominal interest rate
on deposits and the central bank lending facilities of 50 quarterly basis points on impact (red,
slotted) to simulate the LTRO intervention by the ECB in December 2011 and February 2012.9
The lower interest rate induces commercial banks to shift from funding through regular
deposits to central bank funding, which increases net worth everything else equal. It follows
from equation (9) that the (collateral) value of a government bond to commercial banks increases:
not only does a bond produce a cash flow in the future, it also allows the intermediary to gain
immediate access to additional central bank funding. However, since intermediaries are balance-
sheet-constrained, purchasing more government bonds also forces them to shift out of private
loans (“Fraction of assets in private loans”), which are not eligible as collateral. Demand for
private loans is reduced, and pushes down the price of capital further, leading to additional capital
losses on private loans. Net worth falls further, and tightens bank balance sheet constraints,
leading to a second round of interest rate increases on private loans and additional capital losses.
The credit spread between private loans and deposits increases on impact by 75 basis points
compared with the no intervention case. Net worth drops with respect to the no intervention
case on impact. The shift out of private loans initially leads to a substantial drop in investment
and pushes down the trough of output by almost 0.5%. Note, however, that the low-interest-rate
on central bank funding allows an expansion of commercial banks’ balance sheets (“Total bank
assets”). The extra space on the balance sheet, though, is not used to expand lending to the real
economy, but to purchase additional government bonds.
The lower interest rate on central bank funding, however, increases commercial bank profits,
and leads (except in the initial period) to higher net worth compared with the no intervention
case. But as long as the interest rate on central bank funding is below that on deposit funding,
intermediaries will invest a larger fraction of their balance sheet in government bonds, thereby
crowding out private credit. Commercial banks, however, are better capitalized after the period
of lower interest rates on central bank funding has ended, and have more space on their balance
sheets to finance capital purchases by the intermediate goods producers. Investment increases
with respect to the no intervention case, leading to a faster recovery along the entire time path
once the intervention has ended.
In the short run, these results contradict the regular narrative concerning a monetary expan-
sion, in which lower interest rates lead to higher output. Instead, the collateral effect dominates
the subsidy effect. The key reason is the fact that commercial banks are balance sheet constrai-
9Under the LTRO, commercial banks were allowed to borrow for 3 years at a nominal interest rate equal to
the MRO rate, which is the short term policy rate of the ECB. The difference with the 1-year Euribor, a measure
of unsecured interbank funding is at least 1%, see also Figure 10 in appendix C. I therefore take an annual spread
between central bank lending facilities and deposits of 2% since the LTRO has a maturity of 3 years, compared
with a 1 year maturity of the 1-year Euribor. This gives a quarterly credit spread of 50 basis points.
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Financial crisis impact, no additional policy vs. unconventional monetary policy












































































































































































Figure 5: Impulse response functions for the case from section 5.1 with no additional policy
(blue, solid) vs. the LTRO, represented by a decrease in the nominal interest rate on central
bank lending facilities of 50 basis points on impact with respect to the nominal interest rate on
regular deposit funding (red, slotted). The financial crisis is initiated through a negative capital
quality shock of 5 percent relative to the steady state.
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ned, and cannot increase their holdings of government bonds, necessary as collateral, without
shedding private loans. In the long run, central bank lending at an interest rate below that on
deposits amounts to an indirect recapitalization of commercial banks, which leads to a stronger
economic recovery.
My results seem to be in line with the data surrounding the period in which the LTRO
was undertaken by the ECB: just as in the data, we see a portfolio shift from private loans to
government bonds. This would explain why credit to the real economy did not expand in the
aftermath of the LTRO, contrary to the expectations of ECB President Draghi, alluded to in the
introduction.
The results clearly introduce a trade-off for policymakers: if they are concerned about the
short run, unconventional central bank lending operations such as the LTRO do not seem to be
a good idea, due to the contractionary short run impact. But when they are concerned about
the long run, the intervention is beneficial, as it supports the long run recovery by delivering a
commercial banking system that is better capitalized. This raises two questions. First, is the
cumulative effect of the central bank intervention positive or negative? Second, can the haircut
policy, indicated by θt, affect the outcome, and if so how?
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5.3 The cumulative intervention effect and the role of the haircut po-
licy θt
In this section I will derive the main result of my paper. We saw in the previous section that
the collateral effect dominates the short run effect, while the subsidy effect dominates the long
run effect. This leads us to the question whether the cumulative effect of increased central bank














where xcbpt+s denotes the value of variable x in period t + s under the central bank intervention,
and xnpt+s the value of variable x in period t + s under the no policy case. Figure 6 displays µD
versus the haircut parameter θt. We clearly see that µD is basically zero, and hardly changes
as I vary θt. This results in two conclusions: first, cumulatively, the subsidy effect and the
collateral effect offset each other, with a net effect that is zero. Second, µD hardly changes as the
haircut parameter θt is varied. This suggests that the collateral policy of the central bank has no
macroeconomic effects. This seems counterintuitive, given the way the central bank intervention
affected the real economy in the previous section, see Figure 5.
Central bank intervention: discounted cumulative multiplier µD vs. θt















Figure 6: Discounted cumulative multiplier µD vs. θt for the central bank intervention of section
5.2, where θt is the haircut parameter of the central bank.
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We therefore turn to Figure 7, which is the result from the same comparison between no
additional policy and unconventional central bank lending as in Figure 5 but for several steady
state values of the haircut parameter θt. Figure 7 shows the difference between the two policies,
expressed as a percentage of steady state output. The upper panel displays the difference in
central bank lending, while the lower panel displays the difference in output.
Variation in haircut parameter θt
















































Figure 7: Both panels display the difference between the case where the nominal interest rate on
central bank lending facilities is lowered by 50 basis points with respect to the nominal interest
rate on regular deposit funding on impact (LTRO) and the no intervention case for different
steady state values of the haircut parameter θt. The blue solid line refers to θt = 0.20, the
red slotted line to θt = 0.45, the green dotted line to θt = 0.70, and the black dashed line to
θt = 0.95. The upper panel displays the difference in central bank (CB) lending, while the lower
panel displays the difference in output.
Contrary to the results in Figure 6, we see that the haircut parameter θt has a large effect
on output and central bank lending. A smaller haircut (larger θt) leads to a stronger collateral
effect and a steeper short-run output contraction. In the long run, however, a smaller θt leads
to a stronger subsidy effect and, through this effect, to a stronger economic recovery.
This can be explained in the following way: the smaller haircut leads to a larger collateral
value: commercial banks obtain more low-interest-rate central bank funding for one euro of
collateral. The higher collateral value induces more crowding out of private loans by government
bonds and leads to a stronger collateral effect. Commercial bank profits, however, increase, as a
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larger share of the balance sheet is financed through low-interest-rate central bank funding. The
recovery of bank balance sheets is accelerated, and leads to a stronger subsidy effect and a long-
run credit expansion. Long-run output increases, and offsets the stronger initial contractionary
impact.
Figures 6 and 7 lead to a clear conclusion regarding the effectiveness of providing low-interest-
rate central bank funding: the cumulative effect from the intervention compared with the no
intervention case is basically zero. Hence the policy is not very effective in stimulating output,
irrespective of the haircut parameter θt. This rather ineffective policy, however, does not imply
that the central bank cannot affect the real economy. Quite the contrary, the haircut parameter
θt allows the central bank to influence the time path of the recovery, and shift output losses
between periods. Setting a high θt induces commercial banks to shift into government bonds (with
a stronger collateral effect and a short run contractionary impact) but indirectly recapitalizes
commercial banks because of a stronger subsidy effect. Reducing θt mitigates the short run
contractionary impact of the central bank policy, but leaves commercial banks weaker capitalized
once the central bank intervention has ended. But no matter what haircut policy θt the central
bank pursues, the cumulative impact with respect to the no intervention cases is basically zero.
This leaves the question whether other policies are more effective in stimulating private credit
provision and output. I will address this question in the next section.
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5.4 Unconventional monetary policy vs. immediate recapitalization
We have seen in the previous section that unconventional central bank lending operations are
rather ineffective, despite the fact that the commercial banking sector is indirectly recapitalized
through the provision of central bank funding at an interest rate below that on deposits. I
therefore investigate in Figure 8 whether a direct recapitalization by the fiscal authority is more
effective. The blue solid line refers to the central bank intervention from section 5.2, while the
red slotted line refers to an immediate debt-financed recapitalization of 1.25% of annual steady
state output, see equation (18).
We clearly see that the debt-financed recap has a positive effect compared with the central
bank intervention, which is most striking in the initial quarters of the financial crisis: the cre-
dit spread falls, and the drop in net worth, output and investment is substantially mitigated.
There are two key reasons why the recap seems to be more effective. First, commercial banks
immediately receive new net worth, in contrast to the indirect recap by the central bank, in
which commercial banks are gradually recapitalized through lower interest rates on central bank
funding. A direct recap therefore immediately alleviates bank balance sheet constraints, allowing
commercial banks to expand the balance sheet at once.
The second reason is the fact that, contrary to the central bank intervention, a direct recap
does not increase the collateral value of government bonds. The interest rate on household
deposits and the central bank lending facilities is the same under the direct recap policy, and
hence the collateral value, indicated by ψt in equation (9) is zero. Commercial banks do not have
an incentive to load up on government bonds, as is the case under the unconventional central
bank intervention. The collateral effect is therefore absent under the direct recap policy, see also
equation (7), and only the subsidy effect is present.
Even though the initial drop in net worth is almost 20% larger under the unconventional
central bank policy, net worth levels have converged after approximately 10 quarters. The credit
spread between private loans and deposits, which measures not only the tightness of the bank
balance sheet constraint, but also the profitability of private loans if no new shocks arrive, is
much larger under the unconventional central bank policy. As long as the credit spread is larger
under the unconventional monetary policy case, net worth accumulation is faster, resulting in a
convergence of net worth. The collateral value of government bonds is zero under both policies
after approximately 10 quarters, and net worth and other credit market conditions are basically
the same, resulting in similar long run macroeconomic outcomes.
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Financial crisis impact: unconventional monetary policy vs. immediate recap













































































































































































Figure 8: Impulse response functions for the case from section 5.2 with a decrease in the nominal
interest rate on central bank lending facilities of 50 basis points on impact with respect to the
nominal interest rate on regular deposit funding (blue, solid) vs. the case where the commercial
banking system receives new net worth equal to 1.25% of annual GDP (red, slotted) through an
immediate debt-financed recapitalization by the fiscal authority. The financial crisis is initiated
through a negative capital quality shock of 5 percent relative to the steady state.
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6 Conclusion
The European Central Bank (ECB) conducted in December 2011 and February 2012 the largest
refinancing operation in its history by providing the European commercial banking system with
more than AC 1000 billion in funding. One of the goals of the program, as stated by ECB president
Draghi, was to expand credit to the real economy. Commercial banks within the Eurozone play
a crucial role in this respect, as more than 80% of debt financing to non-financial corporations
is intermediated by commercial banks. Empirical evidence, though, suggests that rather than
expanding private credit, the ECB funding was used to purchase additional government bonds.
In this paper I investigate whether unconventional central bank lending operations can expand
credit provision to the real economy, and through that channel stimulate output.
I construct a DSGE model with balance-sheet-constrained commercial banks that have a
portfolio choice between private loans and government bonds. The central bank provides funding
to commercial banks, for which commercial banks pledge collateral in the form of government
bonds. I model the LTRO intervention of the ECB by decreasing the interest rate on central bank
funding with respect to that on regular deposit funding. I contribute to the literature by linking
private credit provision and central bank lending operations through a collateral constraint which
determines how much central bank funding is obtained for one euro of government bonds pledged
as collateral. Government bonds therefore have a collateral value, which affects the portfolio
decision of the commercial bank.
I find a contractionary short-run effect, but an expansionary long-run effect on credit provision
and output when the central bank engages in unconventional lending operations with a balance-
sheet-constrained commercial banking system. The provision of central bank funding at an
interest rate below that on deposits induces commercial banks to shift from private credit to
government bonds, an effect referred to as the collateral effect, which has a contractionary short-
run effect on output. Bank balance sheets recover faster, however, as profits increase due to lower
interest rate payments, which increases credit provision and output in the long run, referred to
as the subsidy effect.
My main result is that there is no cumulative effect on output with respect to the no interven-
tion case. This result is independent of the haircut policy of the central bank. A smaller haircut
provides commercial banks with more central bank funding for one euro of government bonds
pledged as collateral, and induces a shift from private loans to government bonds, which increases
the contractionary impact of the collateral effect. At the same time, the shift into government
bonds allows the commercial banks to finance a larger fraction of their balance sheet through
central bank funding, thereby decreasing interest rate payments and increasing commercial bank
profits: the stronger collateral effect implies a stronger long-run subsidy effect, which offsets the
collateral effect. Even though the cumulative impact on output is zero, the haircut policy allows
the central bank to shift output gains and losses over time.
I find that an immediate debt-financed recapitalization is more effective in expanding private
credit than unconventional central bank lending operations. The recap instantaneously increases
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net worth of commercial banks and alleviates bank balance sheet constraints, similar to the un-
conventional lending operations, but does not induce commercial banks to shift into government
bonds. Credit to the real economy expands, and leads to an increase in output across the entire
time path.
My model explains why banks did not expand credit to the real economy in response to the
LTROs of December 2011 and February 2012. The LTROs, which were particularly attractive
for banks in Italy, Spain and Portugal, increased the collateral value of government bonds, as
they could be used to get additional LTRO funding. To buy more government bonds, banks
had to shift from private credit, as they were undercapitalized at the time (Hoshi and Kashyap,
2015). To avoid this collateral effect, governments could have recapitalized the banking sector
directly or through European funds, which is more likely to have expanded credit provision to
the real economy than the LTROs.
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A Mathematical derivations: Price stickiness & Monetary
Policy
A.1 Financial intermediaries
In the main text, the collateral constraint is given by dcbj,t ≤ θtqbtsb,pj,t . In this appendix I will
apply a more general formulation, namely dcbj,t ≤ θtκtsb,pj,t , where κt can be equal to:
κt =
{
qbt “Regular collateral constraint”;
1 “No risk-adjustment collateral constraint”.
38
I also include the possibility of financial sector net worth support by the government ngj,t =




t nj,t−1. The law of motion for net









































































− (1 + rdt+1 + τnt+1 − τ˜nt+1) dj,t − (1 + rcbt+1 + τnt+1 − τ˜nt+1) dcbj,t,
Now we remember the optimization problem of the financial intermediary:
Vj,t = max{sk,pj,t ,sb,pj,t ,dj,t,dcbj,t}
Et {βΛt,t+1 [(1− σ)nj,t+1 + σVj,t+1]} ,
s.t.
Vj,t ≥ λkqkt sk,pj,t + λbqbtsb,pj,t ,
nj,t + dj,t + d
cb
j,t ≥ qkt sk,pj,t + qbtsb,pj,t ,
nj,t =
(




























We set up the accompanying Lagrangian of the problem:





















− (1 + rdt+1 + τnt+1 − τ˜nt+1) dj,t − (1 + rcbt+1 + τnt+1 − τ˜nt+1) dcbj,t)+ σV (sk,pj,t , sb,pj,t , dj,t, dcbj,t) ]}
− µtλkqkt sk,pj,t − µtλbqbtsb,pj,t
+ χt
[ (
























This gives rise to the following first order conditions:
sk,pj,t : (1 + µt)Et
βΛt,t+1










− µtλkqkt − χtqkt = 0, (30)
sb,pj,t : (1 + µt)Et
βΛt,t+1










− µtλbqbt − χtqbt + ψtθtκt = 0, (31)
dj,t : (1 + µt)Et
βΛt,t+1










+ χt = 0, (32)
dcbj,t : (1 + µt)Et
βΛt,t+1










+ χt − ψt = 0, (33)











− λkqkt sk,pj,t − λbqbtsb,pj,t
]
µt = 0, (34)
χt :
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ψt = 0. (36)


































































Subsititution of the envelope conditions (37) - (40) with (30) - (33), we find the following relation











βΛt,t+1 [(1− σ) + σχt+1]
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βΛt,t+1 [(1− σ) + σχt+1]
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βΛt,t+1 [(1− σ) + σχt+1]
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βΛt,t+1 [(1− σ) + σχt+1]
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= ηt − ψt
1 + µt
(48)
We remember that we can rewrite (45) into χt = (1 + µt) ηt. Subsitution of (45) - (48). This
gives rise to the following first order conditions:
νkt = Et
{
βΛt,t+1 [(1− σ) + σ (1 + µt+1) ηt+1]
(








βΛt,t+1 [(1− σ) + σ (1 + µt+1) ηt+1]
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βΛt,t+1 [(1− σ) + σ (1 + µt+1) ηt+1]
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βΛt,t+1 [(1− σ) + σ (1 + µt+1) ηt+1]
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Now we assume a particular function for the value function, and will later check whether our



















j,t − ηtdj,t − ηcbt dcbj,t
Substitution of the first order conditions (46) - (48) in the value function of the typical financial

































































































where the term with ψt drops out because of the slackness condition (36). We can now rewrite
the leverage constraint:






































j,t ≤ (1 + µt) ηtnj,t.
Now we substitute the expressions for the shadow values of the different asset classes in the
expression for the expected discounted profits of the financial intermediary to obtain the following
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expression:






























(1 + µt+1) ηt+1nj,t+1
]})
= Et {βΛt,t+1 [(1− σ)nj,t+1 + σ (1 + µt+1) ηt+1nj,t+1]}
= Et {βΛt,t+1 [(1− σ) + σ (1 + µt+1) ηt+1]nj,t+1}
= Et
{
βΛt,t+1 [(1− σ) + σ (1 + µt+1) ηt+1]
[ (





























Comparing with the initial guess for the solution, we obtain the following first order conditions:
νkt = Et
{
βΛt,t+1 [(1− σ) + σ (1 + µt+1) ηt+1]
(








βΛt,t+1 [(1− σ) + σ (1 + µt+1) ηt+1]
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βΛt,t+1 [(1− σ) + σ (1 + µt+1) ηt+1]
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βΛt,t+1 [(1− σ) + σ (1 + µt+1) ηt+1]
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We see that the solutions (49) - (52) and (53) - (56) coincide, and hence that our initial guess
























+ χpt−1 + n
g
t − n˜gt (57)
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A.1.1 Financial Sector First Order Conditions









































βΛt,t+1 [(1− σ) + σ (1 + µt+1) ηt+1]
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A.1.2 Further simplification of the F.O.C.’s for mathematical proofs
Now we combine some of the F.O.C.’s found in section A.1.1 to obtain a better economic under-
standing and more intuition. We start by combining (58) and (59), while substituting (60) for
χt/(1 + µt) to obtain:







































where Ωt,t+1 = βΛt,t+1 [(1− σ) + σ (1 + µt+1) ηt+1] refers to the stochastic discount factor of the
financial intermediaries, which is equal to the household’s stochastic discount factor, augmented
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to incorporate the financial frictions.
Now we combine (60) and (61) to obtain the following relation between theshadow value on
deposit funding and central bank funding:
ψt
1 + µt
= ηt − ηcbt .














t , and χt. Thus we
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Ωt,t+1 = βΛt,t+1 [(1− σ) + σ (1 + µt+1) ηt+1] . (78)
A.2 Production Process
A.2.1 Capital Producers
At the end of period t, when the intermediate goods firms have produced, the capital producers
buy the remaining stock of capital (1−δ)ξtkt−1 from the intermediate goods producers at a price
qkt . They combine this capital with goods bought from the final goods producers (investment it)
to produce next period’s beginning of period capital stock kt. This capital is being sold to the
intermediate goods producers at a price qkt . We assume that the capital producers face convex
adjustment costs when transforming the final goods bought into capital goods, set up such that
changing the level of gross investment is costly. Hence we get:
kt = (1− δ)ξtkt−1 + [1−Ψ(ιt)]it, Ψ(x) = γ
2
(x− 1)2, ιt = it/it−1. (79)
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ξt represents a capital quality shock which will be discussed later. Profits are passed on to the
households, who own the capital producers. The profit at the end of period t equals:
Πct = q
k
t kt − qkt (1− δ)ξtkt−1 − it.




















)− 1− qkt ιtΨ′(ιt) + βEtΛt,t+1qkt+1ι2t+1Ψ′(ιt+1) = 0,





























A.2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
We remember that period t profits are given by:
Πi,t = mtzt(ξtki,t−1)αh1−αi,t + q
k
t (1− δ)ξtki,t−1 − (1 + rkt )qkt−1ki,t−1 − wthi,t.
The intermediate goods producing firms maximize expected current and future profits using the
household’s stochastic discount factor βsΛt,t+s (since they are owned by the households), taking



























hi,t : wt = (1− α)mtyi,t/hi,t.
In equilibrium profits will be zero. By substituting the first order condition for the wage rate into




−1(αmtyi,t/ki,t−1 + qkt (1− δ)ξt)− 1.
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Now we rewrite the first order condition for labor and the expression for the ex-post return on
capital to find the factor demands:
ki,t−1 = αmtyi,t/[qkt−1(1 + r
k
t )− qkt (1− δ)ξt],
hi,t = (1− α)mtyi,t/wt.
By substituting the factor demands into the production technology function, we get for the














Retail firms purchase goods (yi,t) from the intermediate goods producing firms for a nominal
price Pmt , and convert these into retail goods (yf,t). These goods are sold for a nominal price
Pf,t to the final goods producer. It takes one intermediate goods unit to produce one retail good
(yi,t = yf,t). All the retail firms produce a differentiated retail good by assumption, therefore
operate in a monopolistically competitive market, and charge a markup over the input price
earning them profits (Pf,t − Pmt )yf,t.
Each period, only a fraction 1−ψ of retail firms is allowed to reset their price, while the ψ re-
maining firms are not allowed to do so, like in Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). The firms allowed to
adjust prices are randomly selected each period. Once selected, they set prices so as to maximize









where yf,t = (Pf,t/Pt)
−yt is the demand function. yt is the output of the final goods producing
firms, and Pt the general price level. Symmetry implies that all firms allowed to reset their prices
























Defining the relative price of the firms that are allowed to reset their prices as pi∗t = P
∗
t /Pt and







Ξ1,t = λtmtyt + βψEtpi

t+1Ξ1,t+1, (83)




The aggregate price level equals:
P 1−t = (1− ψ)(P ∗t )1− + ψP 1−t−1 .
Dividing by P 1−t yields the following law of motion:
(1− ψ)(pi∗t )1− + ψpi−1t = 1. (85)
A.2.4 Final Goods Producers
Final goods firms purchase intermediate goods which have been repackaged by the retail firms
in order to produce the final good. The technology that is applied in producing the final good







f,t df , where yf,t is the output of the retail firm indexed by f .  is
the elasticity of substitution between the intermediate goods purchased from the different retail
firms. The final goods firms face perfect competition, and therefore take prices as given. Thus
they maximize profits by choosing yf,t such that Ptyt −
∫ 1
0
Pf,tyf,tdf is maximized. Taking the
first order conditions with respect to yf,t, gives the demand function of the final goods producers
for the retail goods. Substitution of the demand function into the technology constraint gives













into the factor demands derived earlier yields:
hi,t = (1− α)mtyf,t/wt, ki,t−1 = αmtyf,t/[qkt−1(1 + rkt )− qkt (1− δ)ξt].
Aggregation over all firms i gives us aggregate labor and capital:







df denotes the price dispersion. It is given by the following recursive
form:
Dt = (1− ψ)(pi∗t )− + ψpitDt−1. (86)
The aggregate capital-labor ratio is equal to the individual capital-labor ratio:
kt−1/ht = α(1− α)−1wt/[qkt−1(1 + rkt )− qkt (1− δ)ξt] = ki,t−1/hi,t. (87)
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Now calculate aggregate supply by aggregating yi,t = zt(ξtki,t−1)αh1−αi,t :∫ 1
0

















So we get the following relation for aggregate supply yt:




h¯ 1/3 Labor supply
Financial intermediaries
φ¯ 6 Leverage ratio
Γk 0.0050 Quarterly credit spread E[r
k − rd]
Γcb 0 Quarterly credit spread E[r
d − rcb]
θ¯ 0.95 Haircut parameter
λb/λk 0.5 Diversion rate bonds over private loans
Government policy
i¯/y¯ 0.2 Investment-output ratio
g¯/y¯ 0.2 Gov’t spending-output ratio
q¯bb¯/y¯ 4 Gov’t liabilities-output ratio (quarterly)
s¯b/b¯ 0.25 Fraction of gov’t financing by banks





β 0.990 Discount rate
υ 0.815 Degree of habit formation
Ψ 3.6023 Relative utility weight of labor
ϕ 0.276 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply
κsb,h 0.0025 Constant portfolio adjustment cost function
sˆb,h 1.6656 Reference level portfolio adjustment cost function
Financial Intermediaries
λk 0.3861 Fraction of private loans that can be diverted
λb 0.1930 Fraction of gov’t bonds that can be diverted
χ 0.0026 Proportional transfer to entering bankers
σ 0.95 Survival rate of the bankers
Intermediate good firms
 4.176 Elasticity of substitution
ψ 0.779 Calvo probability of keeping prices fixed
α 0.330 Effective capital share
Capital good firms
γ 1.728 Investment adjustment cost parameter
δ 0.0592 Depreciation rate
Autoregressive components
ρz 0.95 Autoregressive component of productivity
ρξ 0.66 Autoregressive component of capital quality
ρr 0.4 Interest rate smoothing parameter
Policy
rc 0.04 Real payment to government bondholder
ρ 0.96 Parameter government debt duration (5 yrs)
κb 0.050 Tax feedback parameter from government debt
κpi 1.500 Inflation feedback on nominal interest rate
κy 0.125 Output feedback on nominal interest rate
Shocks
σz 0.010 Standard deviation productivity shock
σξ 0.050 Standard deviation capital quality shock
σr 0.0025 Standard deviation interest rate surprise shock




























































Figure 9: Asset holdings of Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs) excluding the European
System of Central Banks in Italy (IT), Spain (ES), and Portugal (PT) from January 2011 to
January 2013. Panel 9a shows total assets, Panel 9b shows loans to non financial corporations
(NFC) and households (HH), while Panel 9c shows domestic bond holdings. Levels have been
rescaled with respect to asset holdings on December 1st, 2011, which has a value of 100 in all














Figure 10: The ECB MRO (Main Refninancing Operation) rate is charged on collateralized
loans with a maturity of 1 week from the ECB. The MRO rate is the ECB’s main instrument for
conducting monetary policy. EURIBOR (Euro InterBank Offered Rate) rates are money market
rates at which commercial banks can obtain unsecured funding in the European interbank market.
Source: European Central Bank (2015).
D First Order Conditions & Equilibrium
D.1 First Order Conditions
The first order conditions given below include the possibility of a recapitalization of the financial
sector by the government, as well as repayment of previously administered government support.
This gives four additional variables that are not present in the model description of the model in
the main part of the paper. These variables are {ngt , n˜gt , τnt , τ˜nt }. I retrieve the model from the
main part of the paper by setting these four variables equal to zero. The household’s first order
conditions are given by:

















































































































+ χpt−1 + n
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pt = nt + dt + d
cb
t , (101)













Ξ1,t = λtmtyt + βψEtpi

t+1Ξ1,t+1, (105)
Ξ2,t = λtyt + βψEtpi
−1
t+1Ξ2,t+1, (106)
1 = (1− ψ)(pi∗t )1− + ψpi−1t , (107)
Dt = (1− ψ)(pi∗t )− + ψpitDt−1. (108)










t − qkt (1− δ)
]α)
, (109)
kt−1/ht = α(1− α)−1wt/[qkt−1(1 + rkt )− qkt (1− δ)ξt], (110)











































ytDt = zt(ξtkt−1)αht1−α. (113)
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The first order conditions for the fiscal authority are given by:

















gt = G, (116)











The first order conditions for the central bank are given by:
rnt = (1− ρr)
(














t − Γcbt , (124)





























at = dt + d
cb
t , (131)








And finally, exogenous processes are given by:
log (zt) = ρz log (zt−1) + εz,t, (133)










t−1, pt−1, kt−1, it−1, bt−1, yt−1,Dt−1, rnt−1, rn,cbt−1 , zt, ξt be the






























t ,Dt, it, kt,
















t , zt, ξt such that:
(i) Households optimize taking prices as given: (89) - (92).
(ii) Financial intermediaries optimize taking prices as given: (93) - (103).
(iii) Capital producers optimize taking prices as given: (111) - (112).
(iv) Intermediate goods producers optimize taking prices as given: (109) - (110)
(v) Retail goods producers that are allowed to change prices optimize taking input prices mt
as given: (104) - (108).
(vi) Final goods producers optimize taking prices as given: (113).
(vii) Asset markets clear: (129) - (131).
(viii) The goods market clears: (132).
(ix) The fiscal variables evolve according to: (114) - (121).
(x) The monetary variables evolve according to: (122) - (128).
(xi) Productivity and capital quality evolve according to: (133) and (134).
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E Robustness checks
To check whether my results are robust, I conduct a robustness check. I will perform this check
along two dimensions. First, I will change some of the key parameters of the model. A second
line of robustness checks is along the dimension of model specification. I perform these checks
to make sure that my model results do not depend on some arbitrary parameter choice or a
particular model specification.
E.1 Parameters
Since the substitution of private loans for government bonds is driving the results of the uncon-
ventional monetary policy operation, I change parameters that are related to government bond
holdings, or the willingness to hold government bonds. I start by adjusting the household’s port-
folio adjustment costs for government bond holdings κsb,h , since this parameter determines the
elasticity with which households are willing to buy and sell government bonds when the demand
for government bonds by commercial banks changes in response to the unconventional central
bank lending. Because the initial calibration shows a rather conservative increase in the recourse
to low-interest-rate central bank funding, I decrease κsb,h from 0.0025 to 0.0010 in Figure 11.
Second I investigate the relative diversion rate λb/λk. An increase in λb/λk increases the
steady state spread between bonds and deposits, and makes it harder for commercial banks to
expand the balance sheet through an increase in bond holdings, since bankers can divert a larger
fraction of bondholdings. I investigate both an decrease in λb/λk from 0.5 to 0.25 (Figure 12),
as well as the case where λb/λk = 0.75 (Figure 13).
Third, I investigate the impact of changing the fraction of government debt on banks’ balance
sheets q¯bb¯ by reducing the steady state level of government liabilities from 100% of annual GDP
to 80% of annual GDP, see Figure 14.
Fourth, I change the steady state fraction of government bonds financed by the household
from 75% to 90% in Figure 15.
Fifth, a parameter that influences the volatility of net worth, and hence of the tightness of
bank balance sheet constraints, is the bankers’ survival rate σ. I look at both a decrease in the




A second line of robustness checks is along the dimension of model specification. One obvious
robustness check is to allow households to intermediate private loans. Another specification
allows for commercial banks to use private loans for collateral purposes in addition to government
bonds. I also allow for an adjusted collateral constraint, which still only features government
bonds, but is adjusted to make sure that the central bank can seize the bondholdings that were
pledged to the central bank under the central bank’s lending operations. The last specification
is the implementation of the zero lower bound (ZLB).
E.2.1 Household financing of private loans
Commercial banks are in reality not the only financiers of private loans to non-financial corpo-
rations. I abstain, however, from introducing household intermediation of private loans in the
main part of the paper for two reasons. First, bank financing of credit to non-financial corporati-
ons accounts for approximately 80% in the Eurozone. Second, I construct a model that includes
household financing of private loans, and find that the results are not significantly affected by the
introduction of household intermediation of private loans. But to check whether the inclusion
of household intermediation of private loans changes the results qualitatively, I introduce the
possibility for households to finance private loans






t−1 is the number of private
loans purchased in period t − 1. Households are less efficient in financial intermediation than
commercial banks, hence they incur financial intermediation costs, which is quadratic in the




















































which give rise to an additional first order condition for private loans sk,ht , next to the first order









 = 1. (135)
This introduces a new parameter, namely κsk,h , into the model. It is reasonable to assume that
transaction costs for households are larger for private credit intermediation than for sovereign
debt intermediation. We therefore set κsk,h = 0.1, which is four times larger than κsb,h . The
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Financial crisis impact, no additional policy vs. unconventional monetary policy
for κsb,h = 0.0010.











































































































































































Figure 11: Impulse response functions for the case from section 5.1 with no additional policy
(blue, solid) vs. the LTRO, represented by a decrease in the nominal interest rate on central
bank lending facilities of 50 basis points on impact with respect to the nominal interest rate on
regular deposit funding (red, slotted). The financial crisis is initiated through a negative capital
quality shock of 5 percent relative to the steady state.
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Financial crisis impact, no additional policy vs. unconventional monetary policy
for λb/λk = 0.25.














































































































































































Figure 12: Impulse response functions for the case from section 5.1 with no additional policy
(blue, solid) vs. the LTRO, represented by a decrease in the nominal interest rate on central
bank lending facilities of 50 basis points on impact with respect to the nominal interest rate on
regular deposit funding (red, slotted). The financial crisis is initiated through a negative capital
quality shock of 5 percent relative to the steady state.
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Financial crisis impact, no additional policy vs. unconventional monetary policy
for λb/λk = 0.75.









































































































































































Figure 13: Impulse response functions for the case from section 5.1 with no additional policy
(blue, solid) vs. the LTRO, represented by a decrease in the nominal interest rate on central
bank lending facilities of 50 basis points on impact with respect to the nominal interest rate on
regular deposit funding (red, slotted). The financial crisis is initiated through a negative capital
quality shock of 5 percent relative to the steady state.
62
Financial crisis impact, no additional policy vs. unconventional monetary policy
for steady state gov’t debt at 80% of annual GDP.












































































































































































Figure 14: Impulse response functions for the case from section 5.1 with no additional policy
(blue, solid) vs. the LTRO, represented by a decrease in the nominal interest rate on central
bank lending facilities of 50 basis points on impact with respect to the nominal interest rate on
regular deposit funding (red, slotted). The financial crisis is initiated through a negative capital
quality shock of 5 percent relative to the steady state.
63
Financial crisis impact, no additional policy vs. unconventional monetary policy
for households financing 90% of sovereign debt in steady state.













































































































































































Figure 15: Impulse response functions for the case from section 5.1 with no additional policy
(blue, solid) vs. the LTRO, represented by a decrease in the nominal interest rate on central
bank lending facilities of 50 basis points on impact with respect to the nominal interest rate on
regular deposit funding (red, slotted). The financial crisis is initiated through a negative capital
quality shock of 5 percent relative to the steady state.
64
Financial crisis impact, no additional policy vs. unconventional monetary policy
for average survival time bankers 8 quarters.














































































































































































Figure 16: Impulse response functions for the case from section 5.1 with no additional policy
(blue, solid) vs. the LTRO, represented by a decrease in the nominal interest rate on central
bank lending facilities of 50 basis points on impact with respect to the nominal interest rate on
regular deposit funding (red, slotted). The financial crisis is initiated through a negative capital
quality shock of 5 percent relative to the steady state.
65
Financial crisis impact, no additional policy vs. unconventional monetary policy
for average survival time bankers 28 quarters.











































































































































































Figure 17: Impulse response functions for the case from section 5.1 with no additional policy
(blue, solid) vs. the LTRO, represented by a decrease in the nominal interest rate on central
bank lending facilities of 50 basis points on impact with respect to the nominal interest rate on
regular deposit funding (red, slotted). The financial crisis is initiated through a negative capital
quality shock of 5 percent relative to the steady state.
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Financial crisis impact, no additional policy vs. unconventional monetary policy
for Γcbt = 25 basis points on impact.











































































































































































Figure 18: Impulse response functions for the case from section 5.1 with no additional policy
(blue, solid) vs. the LTRO, represented by a decrease in the nominal interest rate on central
bank lending facilities of 25 basis points on impact with respect to the nominal interest rate on
regular deposit funding (red, slotted). The financial crisis is initiated through a negative capital
quality shock of 5 percent relative to the steady state.
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Financial crisis impact, no additional policy vs. unconventional monetary policy
for Γcbt = 75 basis points on impact.










































































































































































Figure 19: Impulse response functions for the case from section 5.1 with no additional policy
(blue, solid) vs. the LTRO, represented by a decrease in the nominal interest rate on central
bank lending facilities of 75 basis points on impact with respect to the nominal interest rate on
regular deposit funding (red, slotted). The financial crisis is initiated through a negative capital
quality shock of 5 percent relative to the steady state.
68






while the aggregate resource constraint (29) changes into:















The qualitative results of the unconventional central bank lending operations do not change upon
introduction of household intermediation of private loans, see Figure 20.
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E.2.2 Private loans under the collateral constraint
In reality, government bonds are not the only security that can be pledged as collateral in
refinancing operations at the ECB. Alternative collateral classes include covered and uncovered
bank bonds, asset-backed securities (ABS), corporate bonds and some other securities. Private
loans to non-financial corporations and households are usually hard to collateralize, and most of
these loans are therefore not used in refinancing operations with the ECB. To test whether the
inclusion of private credit under the collateral constraint affects my result, I change the collateral
constraint into:
dcbj,t ≤ θkt qkt sk,pj,t + θbtqbtsb,pj,t , (138)
where θkt , respectively θ
b
t denote the haircut parameter on private loans, respectively government
bonds. In line with actual ECB policy, I take θkt to be smaller than θ
b
t , i.e. the ECB applies a
larger haircut on private loans, which are considered to be more risky than government bonds.
The first order conditions for the portfolio choice between private loans and government













































Just as in the previous section, I include household intermediation of private loans under this
specification. We immediately see that the inclusion of private credit under the collateral con-
straint is not capable to offset the effect of the collateral requirement on the portfolio decision of
the commercial banks. There are two reasons for this: first, government bonds usually carry a
smaller haircut than private loans, i.e. θbt > θ
k
t . Hence a commercial bank obtains more central
bank funding for a euro of government bonds than for a euro of private loans. Hence govern-
ment bonds are more attractive collateral than private loans. At the same, the balance sheet
constraint is more binding for private loans than for government bonds, as reflected by the fact
that λk > λb. Hence it is harder to expand the balance sheet by a unit of private loans to obtain
more funding from the central bank than by buying a government bond. This is a second reason
why buying government bonds is more attractive when commercial banks want to obtain more
central bank funding. Offsetting the distortion in the portfolio decision induced by the central
bank requires θbt = (λb/λk) θ
k




t , which implies that it is easier
to expand the balance sheet by buying private loans than by buying government bonds, which




t , i.e. a smaller haircut for private loans
than for government bonds, which is in sharp contrast with current central bank policies at the




t , we see that
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Financial crisis impact, no additional policy vs. unconventional monetary policy
with household intermediation of private loans.










































































































































































Figure 20: Impulse response functions for the case from section 5.1 with no additional policy
(blue, solid) vs. the LTRO, represented by a decrease in the nominal interest rate on central
bank lending facilities of 50 basis points on impact with respect to the nominal interest rate on
regular deposit funding (red, slotted). The financial crisis is initiated through a negative capital
quality shock of 5 percent relative to the steady state.
71
θbt − (λb/λk) θkt > 0. Hence including private loans under the collateral constraint still induces
commercial banks to shift out of private loans and into government bonds, although the effect
will be muted with the case where private loans can not be pledged as collateral, i.e. θkt = 0.
To summarize, there are two reasons why government bonds remain more attractive as colla-
teral. First it is easier to expand the balance sheet by one unit of government bonds than by one
unit of private loans, as the balance sheet constraint is less binding for government bonds than
for private loans, since λb < λk. Second, the haircut on government bonds is smaller than on
private loans, i.e. θbt > θ
k
t . Hence more central bank funding is obtained for a unit of government
bonds as collateral than for a unit of private loans as collateral.
Figure 21 shows the result from a simulation where the haircut on private loans is 50%, i.e.
θkt = 0.50, and the elasticity of household demand for private loans κsk,h is equal to 0.1, as in the
version with household intermediation of private loans, but no private loans under the collateral
constraint. Ofcourse the shift out of private loans and into government bonds is reduced when
compared with the case where private loans are not eligible for collateral purposes, but the short
term contractionary effect remains.
72
E.2.3 Zero Lower Bound
In this section I implement the zero lower bound by setting the interest rate smoothing parameter
at ρr = 0.999 in Figure 22. This is strictly speaking not the same as the zero lower bound, but
captures the fact that endogenous changes in output and inflation do not cause an adjustment
in the nominal interest rate.
73
Financial crisis impact, no additional policy vs. unconventional monetary policy
with private loans as collateral.









































































































































































Figure 21: Impulse response functions for the case from section 5.1 with no additional policy
(blue, solid) vs. the LTRO, represented by a decrease in the nominal interest rate on central
bank lending facilities of 50 basis points on impact with respect to the nominal interest rate on
regular deposit funding (red, slotted). The financial crisis is initiated through a negative capital
quality shock of 5 percent relative to the steady state.
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Variation in haircut parameter θt at zero lower bound.
















































Figure 22: Both panels display the difference between the case where the nominal interest rate on
central bank lending facilities is lowered by 50 basis points with respect to the nominal interest
rate on regular deposit funding on impact (LTRO) and the no intervention case for different
steady state values of the haircut parameter θt. The blue solid line refers to θt = 0.20, the
red slotted line to θt = 0.45, the green dotted line to θt = 0.70, and the black dashed line
to θt = 0.95. The upper panel displays the difference in central bank (CB) lending, while the
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